Give HOPE a chance

Repeat criminal offenders, including those violating probation, aren’t given jail sentences, more often than not, out of sympathy. It’s just not practical. The ballot measures of Measures 57 and 61 last fall sought to clear a bit of this up, demanding more overall prison beds to handle new standards.

The high cost of either measure (estimated far more than $500 million for 61 and “only” $411 million in five years for 57) was a large factor in opposition to both, but 57 managed to ride the fence of being the cheaper option, while remaining tough on criminals.

But it’s clear that to actually carry out 57, it’s still a lot of money.

And that’s where HOPE comes in. HOPE (Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement program) is as plan to save money, save jail beds and increase the swiftness and harshness of judge decisions for probation violators. Something along the same lines can be implemented in Oregon. It deserves a good look.

Maxine Bernstein of The Oregonian writes, “The program would be modeled after the nationally recognized HOPE program in Hawaii, in which high-risk offenders go before a judge for every probation violation and are sanctioned to short jail stays to try to keep them on track.”

But what are the tradeoffs?

Indeed, a program such as HOPE here has a cost. In this case, the cost would come through the federal stimulus—while the marriage of local and federal spheres is frightening, it is what it is.

It would appear perhaps foolish that Oregon take $13.5 million of its stimulus dollars, when Oregon has a revenue problem, school districts are cutting spending and welfare assistance is growing tighter.

Instinct would be to prevent these sacred cows from making cuts by moving the cash directly there. But programs like HOPE have long-term implications.

Best estimates are that it could save us between $12 and $15 million through 2011, and then another $25 million in the two following years—numbers figured by the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission’s executive director, Craig Prins.

How? By allowing judges to reward and punish behavior on probation: less supervision (a reward) equals fewer hours paid for enforcement. Likewise, the judge can administer what the creator of the program in Hawaii calls, “certain and proportionate consequences.”

So a judge could have the power to sentence short, immediate jail stays, ranging from a few days to a few months, depending on the number of probation violations.

In theory, the incentive of less supervision promised for good behavior should allow a judge to keep certain offenders from the minimum prison stays required by Measure 57, thus saving precious jail bed space and money.

There are, of course, still questions: Why do prisons cost so much to build and maintain, apart from the personnel? Could we save money in the type of prisons we build?

And more importantly, will it have the overall desired effect on criminal behavior?

Again, that’s not the kind of questions government action can answer. There are always too many other cultural factors to tie House Bills the filling of prison cells.

This is certainly no guarantee that it will deter criminality. The only deterrents are what the rational criminal fears—execution comes to mind.

But government has an obligation to do what it has set out to do with efficiency. If we are not going to rely on deterrents, then an efficient system of rewards and punishments is ideal.

It’s ideal especially when it saves some of the estimated cost of Measure 57, without harming the measure’s overall goal.

And what threatens the minimum sentences imposed by Measure 57 are activist judges who use their ability to change sentences and let people off easy.

But with recommendations from not only the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission, and Multnomah County’s Department of Community Justice director, Scott Taylor.

Bernstein notes that Taylor feels the program may have some overlap with existing abilities of probation officers to recommend sentencing, but now judges will have the more flexibility in sentencing.

A plan modeled on HOPE has holes—judges may use the leeway poorly. It’s deterrent and encouragement effects are hard to predict. But if, due to its efficiency, cut state spending, then we are headed in the right direction.